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I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of their first year in law school, most students have been
introduced to the rule against perpetuities and recognize John Chipman Gray's
famous statement of the rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."'
The rule dates back to seventeenth century England2 and has served as a means of
properly limiting a person's control over the disposition of their property after

I

JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

2

See Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1,22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
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death.3 Almost since its inception, the rule against perpetuities has been a thorn in
the sides of law students, practicing attorneys, and judges alike. Analysis under the
common-law rule has been described as "quirky, difficult to justify, and unfair" 4 in
light of doctrines such as the fertile octogenarian, 5 the unborn widow,6 and the
administrative contingency.7 Thus, over the years, many jurists have argued for the
reformation of the rule.
Reformation of the rule against perpetuities finally came on a large scale in
1986 when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Statutory Rule against perpetuities (USRAP). 8 The Uniform
Statutory Rule adopted a three-step process in performing perpetuity analysis: (1)
analysis under the common-law rule; (2) a ninety-year "wait-and-see" period for
interests that violate the common-law rule; and (3) deferred reformation for
interests that fail to vest within the ninety-year period. 9 Thus, for interests that are
initially invalid under the common-law rule, the uniform statutory rule places
ownership of the property in limbo for as much as ninety years after the interest is
created.10 Therefore, while the uniform statutory rule may have solved some of the
injustices that existed under the common-law rule, it also nullified the predictability

See THOMAs F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 183 (2rded. 1984).
3

4
David M. Becker, If You Think You No Longer Need to Know Anything About the Rule against
perpetuities, Then Read This!, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 713, 713 (1996).
The fertile octogenarian rule has been defined as "[tlhe conclusive presumption of fertility of any
person, male or female, regardless of age or medical history." W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities:The Nutshell
Revisited, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 992 (1965). For cases discussing the fertile octogenarian rule, see
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 392 A.2d 445, 450 (Conn. 1978); Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498,
501 (S.C. 1973) (When applying the common-law rule against perpetuities "[tihe possibility of childbirth is
never extinct"); Crockett v. Scott, 284 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1955) (recognizing the presumption that a woman
age 50 is capable of having children); Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787).
6
The unborn widow rule refers to the invalidity of a gift to A's issue who survive A and his widow due
5

to the possibility that A may many a woman unborn at the testator's death, "thus making the gift...
contingent on termination of a life not in being." W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities:The Nutshell Revisited, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 973, 992 (1965). For cases involving the unborn widow doctrine, see Dickerson v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 595 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1980); Lanier v. Lanier, 126 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. 1962); Perkins v. Iglehart, 39 A.2d
672 (Md. 1944); Brookover v. Grimm, 190 S.E. 697 (W. Va. 1937).
The administrative contingency doctrine makes a gift "only to [those] persons who are living at the
time when administration is completed and distribution is made" invalid due to the possibility that "it is
mathematically possible that it [the administration of his estate] will take more than the period of
perpetuities." W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 644 (1938). For cases
involving the administrative contingency doctrine, see Prime v. Hyne, 67 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Ct. App. 1968);
Ryan v. Beshk, 170 N.E. 699 (Ill. 1930).
6
See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 321 (1993).
7

See John D. Moore, Note, The Uniform StatutoryRule againstperpetuities: Taming the "TechnicalityRidden Legal Nightmare," 95 W.Va. L. Rev. 193, 200 (1992).
10
See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule against perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
9

UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1025 (1987).
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and certainty that were the hallmarks of the common-law rule.11 As a result, the
uniform statutory rule created new difficulties in situations involving real property
because it defers reformation of the interests for as much as ninety years and
creates uncertainty of title for the wait-and-see period, 12 thus increasing the
inalienability of land,"3 which has long been against public policy and the policy of
the courts. 4
This Note will examine the anomaly created by the adoption of the
Uniform Statutory Rule against perpetuities where real property is involved.
Furthermore, it will attempt to provide for a judicial resolution of this problem in
West Virginia where the doctrine of equitable modification i s remains good law.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

The Common-Law Rule Against Perpetuities

The common-law rule against perpetuities has been the law in West
Virginia ever since the state was created in 1863.16 As early as 1869, the West
Virginia Supreme Court judicially recognized the traditional form of the commonlaw rule, stating that:
An executory devise, either of real or personal
estate, is good if limited to vest within the compass
of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years
afterwards, adding thereto, however, in case of an
infant en ventre sa mere, sufficient time to cover the
ordinary period of gestation of such child. But the

The common-law rule against perpetuities created predictability of results and certainty oftitle due to
the fact that the rule was applied at the time the interest was created. It was the harshness ofthese results that
the uniform statutory rule was designed to remedy. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETuITIES § 1
cmt. A, 8B U.L.A. 342.
12
See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 1049-1050.
13

See id. at 1043-44.

14
See LEwiS M. SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 237 (8" Reprint 1993) (2 ed. 1966) ("In general, it
may be said that the law has always favored the free alienability of property.").
15
The doctrine of equitable modification provides for judicial reformation of certain non-charitable
devises that, on their face, violate the rule against perpetuities but which could be modified to manifest the
general intent of the testator and to conform with the underlying policy ofthe rule. See Berry v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).
116
See W. VA. CODE, Vol. 1, Report of the Code Commission at vii (explaining that "[diuring the Civil
War the State of West Virginia was created and, by section 8, of Article XI of its Constitution of 1863, such
parts of the common law and of the laws of the State ofVirginia as were in force within the boundaries of the
State of West Virginia when the Constitution became effective, and were not repugnant thereto, were
declared to be the law of this State until altered or repealed by the legislature.") See also Higgenbotham v.
Rucker, 6 Va. 313 (1800) (establishing the existence ofthe rule against perpetuities in Virginia); Pleasants v.
Pleasants, 6 Va. 319 (1800); Griffith v. Thomson, 28 Va. 321 (1829); Jiggetts v. Davis, 28 Va. 368 (1829).
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limitation, in order to be valid, must be so made that
the estate, or whatever is devised or bequeathed, not
necessarily vest within the
only may, but must,
17
prescribed period.
Historically, the purposes of the common-law rule could be stated as
follows:
When future interests in specific land or other things
are involved, the purpose and policy of the rule may
properly be said to be the furtherance of
marketability. But if the future interests are interests
in a revolving fund, such as corporate shares or
beneficial interests in trusts, a further rationale must
be recognized, namely: the rule strikes a fair balance
between the desires of the living generation to
dispose of the property which it enjoys and the
desires of future generations to dispose of the
property which they will enjoy. 8
Thus, as one can see, free marketability and the desire for the wealth of the
world to be controlled by living persons and not by the dead have been major
motivating factors in the operation of the rule. West Virginia courts strictly adhered
to the common-law rule19 until the 1930,s,20 when the first modifications to the rule
against perpetuities were made in West Virginia.
B.

Cy Presfor CharitableTrusts

The first important deviation from the common-law rule against
perpetuities in West Virginia came indirectly as a result of the recognition of the
doctrine of cy pres, which applies to charitable trusts.2 1 In 1931, the West Virginia
Legislature enacted § 35-2-2 of the West Virginia Code, which applies cy pres to
charitable trusts and gives the court:
full power to appoint or designate a trustee or
trustees to execute the trust, or to designate the
beneficiaries in, or the objects of, any such trust, or
17

Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597, 612 (1869).

18

SIMmS, supra note 14, at 253-54.

19

See, e.g., Greco v. Meadow River Coal & Land Co., 113 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1960); First Huntington

Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1953); Brookover v. Grimm, 190 S.E. 697 (WV.
Va. 1937); Hooper v. Wood, 125 S.E. 350 (W. Va. 1924); Prichard v. Prichard, 113 S.E. 256 (W. Va. 1922);
Knox v. Knox, 9 W. Va. 124 (1876).
20
The common-law rule against perpetuities was indirectly modified in 1931 when the West Virginia
Legislature adopted the doctrine of cy pres, which removed charitable trusts from the application of the rule.
See W. VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1997).
21
See id.
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where such trust does not admit the specific
enforcement or literal execution, to carry into effect
as near as may be the intent and purposes of the
person creating such trust.22
Consequently, under the trust doctrine of cy pres, "if it is impossible,
impractical or illegal to carry out the terms of a charitable trust, and the settlor has
indicated a general charitable purpose, the court will authorize the substitution of
another charitable scheme within the general purpose."3
Before the enactment of this section, the doctrine of cy pres was not in
force in West Virginia, 24 and testamentary dispositions for charitable purposes were
required to be as definite as a provision creating a private trust in order to be valid
and effective.2 s However, as a result of the enactment of § 35-2-2 in West Virginia,
gifts to public charities are not subject to the rule against perpetuities.e Thus,
although the doctrine of cy pres was not legislatively adopted to deal with the rule
against perpetuities, the rule was, nevertheless, one of the problems that cy pres
"solved" where charitable trusts are involved.
The Doctrineof EquitableModification

C.

The next major change to the common-law rule against perpetuities in
West Virginia came in 1980. In the case of Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 27 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals judicially reformed the rule against perpetuities
by adopting the doctrine of equitable modification in order to "ameliorate the harsh
consequences of 'remorseless application' of the rule." 28 In Berry, the testatrix died
leaving a will that established a private educational trust for the descendants of her
husband's brothers and sisters.29 The trustee was given discretion to provide
educational expenses for class members satisfying certain conditions.30 The trust
was to last for twenty-five years after the death of the testatrix or until the principal

22

Id.

23

SIMES, supra note 14, at 275.

24

See Beatty v. Union Trust & Deposit Co., 13 S.E.2d 760,761 (W. Va. 1941).

25

See id.at 760.

26

See Mercantile Banking & Trust Co. v. Showacre, 135 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1926) ("Th[e] rule [against

perpetuities], while applicable to private trusts, has generally no application to public benefactions, and
certainly none to public charities which are designed to be perpetual.").
262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980). For a discussion on the effects of the Berry decision on perpetuities
27
reform, see generally, Donna P. Grill, PerpetuiliesReform: A Signal From West Virginia, 11 Real Est. L. J.
116 (1982).
28
Berry, 262 S.E.2d at 770.
29

See id. at 767-68.

30

See id at 768.
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was reduced to $5,000 or less, whichever occurred first. 1 At the termination of the
trust, the trust res was to be distributed per stirpes to the then-living descendants of
the brothers and sisters of the testatrix's husband. 2
Realizing that the trust potentially violated the rule against perpetuities, the
executrix, Ms. Josephine Berry, entered into a trust termination agreement with the
trustee.3 The terms of the agreement reduced the trust duration from twenty-five to
twenty-one years and required the executrix to initiate a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether the trust, in fact, violated the rule against perpetuities
and whether it was proper for the executrix and trustee to enter into a trust
termination agreement that amended the trust duration.34 The trial court found that
the trust provision did violate the Rule against perpetuities and was, therefore, void
and without force.3 Additionally, the court held that the executrix and trustee did
not have the authority to enter a trust termination agreement.3 Executrix Berry
appealed these findings to the West Virginia Supreme Court.
On appeal, the court held that the will of the testatrix should be modified to
reduce the designated duration of the trust from twenty-five years to twenty-one
years, thus satisfying the rule against perpetuities. 37 In reaching its decision, the
court adopted a doctrine of "equitable modification,"' ' which applies to certain
non-charitable devises that, on their face, violate the rule against perpetuities, but
which could be modified to conform with the rule's underlying policy. 9
Under the doctrine of equitable modification, a non-charitable devise or
bequest that violates the rule against perpetuities will be modified if the following
criteria are met: (1) the testator's intent is expressed in the instrument or can be
readily determined by a court; (2) the testator's general intent does not violate the
rule against perpetuities; (3) the testator's particular intent, which does violate the
rule, is not a critical aspect of the testamentary scheme; and (4) the proposed
modification will effectuate the testator's general intent, will avoid the
consequences of intestacy, and will conform to the policy considerations
underlying the rule.40
The testamentary trust in Berry met all these criteria.4 ' First, the testatrix's
31

See id.

32

See id.

33

See Berry, 262 S.E.2d at 768.

34

See id.

35

See id.
See id.

37

See id. at 772.

38

See Berry, 262 S.E.2d at 770.

39

See id.

40

See id.
at771.

41

See id.
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general intent was clearly expressed in her will when she stated, "I believe it was
the desire of my husband that such funds as I might have at my death should be
used to help such persons [who are later defined in this section] obtain
educations."42 Second, her general intention, as expressed above, did not violate the
rule against perpetuities. 3 Third, there was no evidence that the testatrix's specific
intent of having the trust last for twenty-five years was a critical aspect of her
testamentary scheme. 4 Finally, the court believed that modifying the duration of
the trust from twenty-five years to twenty-one years would preserve the testatrix's
general intent, avoid intestacy for that portion of her estate, and ensure that the trust
property would not be controlled beyond the perpetuities period. 5
One final important point to make is that, in its decision, the Berry court
recognized the rule against perpetuities 46 and modified the will to conform to it,
focusing on will cases and the testatrix's intent. 47 Thus, one could argue that the
Berry case was limited to testamentary dispositions. More importantly, however,
one could make a strong argument that the doctrine of equitable modification
addresses the will rather than operating as a subsidiary doctrine of the Rule against
perpetuities.
Thus, in summary, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, West Virginia recognized the common-law rule in its
traditional form. However, the common-law rule was indirectly modified by the
statutory recognition of the trust doctrine of cy pres, which removed gifts to public
charities from the application of the common-law rule, and was later reformed by
the immediate judicial reformation available for certain testamentary devises or
bequests that violated the rule under the doctrine of equitable modification.
III. THE UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Analysis Under the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities

A.

The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (hereinafter USRAP) was
enacted in West Virginia in 1992.48 USRAP superseded the common-law rule
against perpetuitiese4 and was intended to be applied prospectively, meaning that
the rule "applies to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is
42

Id.
See Berry, 262 S.E.2d at 771.

44

See id.

45

See id.

46

See id. at 770.

47

See id.at 770-71.

48

See W. VA. CODE §§ 36-IA-1 to -8 (1997).

49

See id. § 36-1A-8.
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created on or after the effective date of this article [1992]." ' o The rule goes on to
clarify that "the time of creation of a nonvested property interest or a power of
appointment is determined under general principles of property law."5' Thus,
"[s]ince a will becomes effective as a dispositive instrument upon the decedent's
death, not upon the execution of the will, general principles of property law
determine that the time when a nonvested property interest or a power of
appointment created by will is created is at the decedent's death."'52
The Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities uses a three-step process in
performing perpetuity analysis: (1) analysis under the common-law rule; (2) a
ninety-year "wait-and-see" period for interests that violate the common-law rule;
and (3) deferred reformation for interests that fail to vest within the ninety-year
period. 53 Specifically, USRAP states that "[a] nonvested property interest is invalid
unless: (1) When the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later
than twenty-one years after the death of an individual then alive; or (2) The interest
either vests or terminates within ninety years after its creation."5 4 Thus, under
USRAP, a nonvested property interest is still initially valid if, at its creation, it is
certain to vest or fail within a life in being plus twenty-one years. However, this is
where USRAP departs from the old common-law rule. "The validity of a nonvested
property interest that is not initially valid is in abeyance. Such an interest is valid if
it vests within the permissible vesting period after its creation."5 Thus, "[a]
nonvested property interest that is not initially valid becomes invalid (and subject
to reformation under Section 3) [only] if it neither vests nor terminates within the
permissible vesting period [90 years] after its creation."' '
In performing the first step of USRAP's perpetuity analysis (the old
common-law analysis), there are several important things to remember. First,
"initial validity under Section l(a)(1) can be established only if there is an
individual for whom there is a causal connection between the individual's death
and the interest's vesting or terminating no later than 21 years thereafter."5 Such
an individual is often referred to as a "measuring life" or "validating life." These

50

Id. § 36-1A-5(a).

51

Id. § 36-IA-2(a).

52

UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 cmt. (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 359 (1993).

See also W. VA. CODE § 41-3-I (1997); Emmert v. Old Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 236, 241 (W. Va. 1978);
Patton v. Corley, 148 S.E. 120, 120-121 (W. Va. 1929).
53
See John D. Moore, Note, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Taming The
"Technicality-Ridden Legal Nightmare," 95 W.VA L. Rev. 193,200 (1992).
54
W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-l(a) (1997). Similarly, W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-l(c) provides that: "A
nongeneral power of appointment ... is invalid unless: (1) When the power is created, it is certain to be
irrevocably exercised or otherwise to terminate no later than twenty-one years after the death of an individual
then alive."
55

UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § I cmt. A (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 336 (1993).

56

Id.

57

Id. cmt. B.
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individuals will vary from situation to situation but often include beneficiaries and
individuals who are related to them." Second, in cases where more than one
nonvested property interest is created, the validity of each interest must be
determined individually.59 Consequently, different validating lives may be used for
each separate interest.n
The final issue to be addressed in the analysis of an interest under USRAP
is the issue of reformation. Section 3 of USRAP has codified a deferred
reformation for interests that fail to vest within the ninety year "wait-and-see"
period6 l However, according to the statute, there are only three situations where
reformation is appropriate.62 The first situation is in the event that an interest
"becomes invalid pursuant to the provisions of section one of this article [after the
ninety year wait-and-see period]. 6 3 The second scenario applies only if a class gift
might become invalid and "the time has arrived when the share of any class
member is to take effect in possession or enjoyment.' ' 64 Finally, a disposition may
be reformed if the interest "is not validated by the provisions of subdivision (1),
subsection (a), section one [§ 36-IA-l(a)(1)] of this article [and] can vest but not
within ninety years after its creation."'
B.

Advantages of USRAP

The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities arguably offers some
vast improvements over the common-law rule. First, USRAP eradicates the
harshness and injustice of the common-law rule by waiting to see whether or not
certain contingencies actually play out, as opposed to invalidating future interests
on the mere possibility that a certain event will take place.6s Thus, cases of unfair
"technical violations," such as the fertile octogenarian, the unborn widow, and the
administrative contingency will no longer haunt law students or the intended

58

For a helpful discussion on measuring and validating lives, see generally Jesse Dukeminier,

Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 (1985).
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § I cmt B, 8B U.L.A. 336-341.

See ALSO UNIF. STATUTORY RULE

59

See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt B, 8B U.L.A. 340.

60

See id.

61

See W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-3 (1997).

62

See id.

64

Id. § 36-IA-3(1).
Id. § 36-1A-3(2).

Id. § 36-1A-3(3). This scenario applies only where it would be impossible for the interest to vest
within the ninety year period. The best example of this would be a 100 year trust In certain situations, the
court would have to reform the terms of the trust to make it last for ninety years.
66
See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cnt. C(2) (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 34243 (1993).
65
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beneficiaries of interests that would have violated the common-law rule. 67 In
addition, USRAP also eliminates the problems created by the "actual-measuringlives" approach, namely, identification and tracing of the measuring lives. 6
Furthermore, USRAP advocates argue that wait-and-see makes estate planning
somewhat easier by essentially operating as a universal perpetuity saving clause.69
Thus, USRAP does have its good points.
C.

Disadvantagesof USRAP

With such important advantages, why would anyone want to apply any
rule but USRAP to a nonvested property interest? The reasons are threefold,
particularly when the interest at issue is an interest in real property: (1) the waitand-see period leaves titles "in a state of uncertainty for an indefinite period of time
pending the happening of [a] contingency; 70 (2) USRAP restricts the free
marketability
of land;7 ' and (3) wait-and-see extends the period of dead hand
72
control.
First, regarding uncertainty of title, wait-and-see "cause[s] a particularly
acute problem in the case of legal future interests in land. 7 3 This is due to the fact
that the title is neither valid nor void until the expected contingency occurs or until
it becomes apparent that the contingency could not possibly occur within the period
of the rule.74 Second, the state of West Virginia has long recognized that "restraints
upon alienation [of property] are against the policy of our law. 7 5 Similarly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court has also held that "the law favors the vesting of
estates and, as a necessary corollary, does not favor restricting the power of
alienation."7 6 There are four main objections to restraints on alienation:
First, such restraints make property unmarketable.
67

See id.

68

See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the

90-Year WaitingPeriod,73 Cornell L. Rev. 157, 162 (1988).
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-And-See, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1714,
1718 (1985). But see David M. Becker, If You Think You No Longer Need to Know Anything About the Rule
againstperpetuities, Then Read This!, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 713 (postulating that knowledge of the commonlaw rule is still required to effectively practice property law and advocating preventive perpetuities
compliance).
70
See SIMES, supra note 14, at 271. See also Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule against
69

perpetuities:Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1049-50 (1987).
71
See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule against perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1043-44 (1987).
72
See id. at 1050.
73

See SIMES, supra note 14, at 271.
See id.

75
76

McCreery v. Johnston, 110 S.E. 464, 465 (W. Va. 1922).
Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Charleston v. Wehrle, 20 S.E.2d 112, 114 (W. Va. 1942).
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The particular land may be made unavailable for its
highest and best use. Second, restraints tend to
perpetuate the concentration of wealth by making it
impossible for the owner to sell property and
consume the proceeds of sale. The restrained owner
cannot dissipate the capital and, perhaps, fall out of
the ranks of the rich. Third, restraints discourage
improvements on land. An owner is unlikely to sink
his money into improvements on land that he cannot
sell. If a mortgage cannot be placed on the land
(giving the moneylender the right to sell the land if
the borrower defaults on the loan), lenders will not
make money available to finance improvements.
Fourth, restraints prevent the owner's creditors from
reaching the property, working hardship on creditors
who rely on the owner's enjoyment of the property
in extending credit.77
Finally, the wait-and-see provisions of USRAP extend the period of dead
hand control during the waiting period beyond what is perceived as an acceptable
period.7
IV. HYPOTHETICAL DIsPosInON AND ANALYSIS UNDER THE UNIFORM STATUTORY
RULE

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the operation of the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, and the anomaly created by it, is to begin with
a hypothetical disposition of property.7 Testator died on August 2, 1993, and was
survived by three children, ten grandchildren, and one great grandchild. He had
executed a Will dated June 1, 1988. In his Will, Testator devised all of his property,
consisting of one large tract of land 300 acres in size, to his children for life, then to
his grandchildren for their lives, and upon the death of his grandchildren, the
property was to go to their respective children and grandchildren. Specifically, the
Will states:
It is my wish and desire that all of my real estate,
consisting of one large tract of 300 acres, be retained
by the members of my family for as long as it is
legally possible to do so. I have three (3) children,
ten (10) grandchildren, and one (1) great grandchild
77

JESSE D

IKEmiNiER
& JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 223 (3rd ed. 1993) (citing 6 American Law of

Property § 26.3 (1952)).
78

See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities:Ninety Years in Limbo, 34

UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1050 (1987).
79
This hypothetical was adopted from an actual disposition taken from a real case with the names and
relevant information changed.
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as of the writing of this Will and may have greatgreat grandchildren born within twenty-one (21)
years of any living great grandchild. Therefore, I
devise and bequeath unto my oldest son, Bill, who
has four children, unto my son, Fred, who has three
children, and unto my daughter, Jane, who has three
children, all of said tract of approximately 300 acres
for and during their respective lifetimes and upon
their death, their share will then pass to and become
the property of their children for their lifetime and
upon their death to their respective children or
grandchildren for their lifetime and upon their death
to their children.
The Will goes on to indicate the Testator's concern about keeping the land
in the family, stating that "I realize the difficulty in retaining the land in this
manner [alluding to the rule against perpetuities], all of which has been explained
to me, but I am especially anxious and desire to keep this property in the family for
as long as legally possible to do so. If any of my three children do not want his or
her share, then they can sell it during their lifetime to any other children or
grandchildren, but I still want it to stay in the family."
Although the Testator executed his Will in 1988, before the enactment of
USRAP in West Virginia, the interests created by the testator's Will would be
analyzed under USRAP because the testator died in 1993, one year after the rule
took effect. In the hypothetical, the testator's first devise of his 300 acre tract is to
his children "for and during their respective lifetimes." According to the testator's
Will, each of his children would receive a one-third undivided interest in the land.
Thus, the testator's conveyance of the land to his children represented a class gift,
creating a vested interest in each child and providing each child with a life estate in
his or her share of the 300 acre tract. This devise represented a valid conveyance,
and since it created a vested interest in the class of the testator's children, and the
class closed at the testator's death, the disposition was not subject to analysis under
the rule against perpetuities (USRAP), which applies only to nonvested property
interests.
Next, the testator devised the respective shares of each of his children to
his grandchildren for their lives upon the death of their respective parent. This
conveyance represented a class gift to the testator's grandchildren, broken up into
three subclasses, with each subclass made up of the grandchildren from any one of
the testator's children. This class gift to the grandchildren was vested subject to
open; vested because there were ascertainable members of the class (and each
subclass) alive at the time of the testator's death, and subject to open because of the
possibility that the testator's children living at his death may have additional
children during their lifetime (i.e., testator's grandchildren). However, "all class
gifts that are subject to open are to be regarded as nonvested property interests for
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the purposes of' analysis under the rule against perpetuities (USRAP).80 Thus, the
testator's conveyance of life estates to each of his grandchildren must meet USRAP
analysis. In performing the analysis, one can determine that the testator's children
can serve as validating lives for the conveyances to his grandchildren.
Consequently, the life estates granted to the testator's grandchildren are initially
valid under USRAP because the class will close, and thus the interest must vest,
within twenty-one years of the respective. lives of the testator's children, all lives in
being at the time of the testator's death.
Finally, the testator conveyed each child's share to "[his grandchildren's]
respective children or grandchildren for their lifetime and upon their death to their
children." These final two devises that the testator makes in his Will are analyzed
in the same manner as the gift to the grandchildren. The testator's conveyance to
his great grandchildren is initially invalid because it is a class gift that is vested
subject to open"1 with no ascertainable validating life. 2 Subsequently, the testator's
attempted devise to his great-great grandchildren is initially invalid because it is a
nonvestedas class gift that has no ascertainable validating life. Therefore, since the
interests created by these conveyances are initially invalid under the first step of the
USRAP perpetuity analysis, a determination of their actual validity is in abeyance
as a result of the ninety-year "wait- and-see" period required by the second step of
the perpetuity analysis. Thus, under USRAP, the Court must wait ninety years from
the date of creation of the interests a4 in order to determine the validity of these
interests. If one or both of the interests vest or fail within that ninety years, then the
interest or interests are valid. Any interest that is still contingent (e.g., if one of the
classes is still open) at the end of the ninety year period is invalid, and the Will
must then be reformed under Section 3 of USRAP.s
Regarding the issue of reformation, the first reformation scenario under
Section 3 of USRAP does not apply to the hypothetical Will because the only way
for an interest to become invalid under this first scenario is for it to remain
nonvested for ninety years after the creation of the interest, and none of the
interests here have remained nonvested for ninety years 86 Similarly, although there
80

UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § I cmt. B (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 336 (1993).
81
There were great grandchildren alive at the time of the testator's death, making the interest vested, and
there is a possibility that more great grandchildren will be born, making the interest subject to open. As
mentioned earlier in this Note, a class gift that is vested subject to open is considered to be a nonvested
property interest for purposes ofanalysis under the rule against perpetuities (USRAP).
82
The testator could possibly have a great grandchild born more than twenty-one years after the death of
the last remaining life in being to a grandchild who was not alive at the time of the testator's death. Thus, the
class would close and the interest would vest too remotely, making the interest initially invalid.

83
The gift to the great-great grandchildren is nonvested because there were no ascertainable members of
the class alive at the time of the testator's death.
84
Since the date of creation of the interests was August 2, 1993, which was also the date ofthe testator's
death, the last day of the ninety year period would be August 1,2083.
See W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-3 (1997).
86

See id. § 36-1A-3(1).
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are class gifts in the hypothetical that might become invalid (the devises to the
great grandchildren and great-great grandchildren), one may assume that the time
has not come for the share of any member of those classes to take effect. Thus, the
second scenario under USRAP's reformation provisions is inapplicable to the
present hypothetical.8' Finally, like the other two situations, the third scenario does
not apply here because it is possible for the initially invalid interests (the
conveyances to the great grandchildren and great-great grandchildren) to vest
within the ninety year period.88 Thus, statutory reformation of the testator's Will
under Section 3 of USRAP is not an option at this time, and the ultimate title (fee
simple control) to the land will most likely remain uncertain for the entire wait-andsee period of ninety years.
V. JUDICIAL REFORMATION OF A WILL UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
MODIFICATION
Although reformation of the testator's will is not currently possible under
Section 3 of USRAP, 89 the disposition should be reformed before the end of the
ninety year "wait-and-see" provision to prevent the uncertainty of title, the
restrictions on marketability, and the extension of dead hand control that are
present under USRAP.90 Thus, one final possibility for reformation of the will
would be judicial reformation under the doctrine of equitable modification. 91 As
mentioned earlier, equitable modification was first introduced in West Virginia by
Berry v. Union Nat 7 Bank.92 In that case, the West Virginia Supreme Court held
that a devise or bequest that violated the rule against perpetuities could be
immediately modified to conform with the rule "if the following conditions are met:
(1) The testator's intent is expressed in the instrument or can be readily determined
by a court; (2) The testator's general intent does not violate the rule against
perpetuities; (3) The testator's particular intent, which does violate the rule, is not a
critical aspect of the testamentary scheme; and (4) The proposed modification will
effectuate the testator's general intent, will avoid the consequences of intestacy,
and will conform to the policy considerations underlying the rule."'
The Berry decision has not been reversed, explicitly repealed, or otherwise
replaced. Nevertheless, it is unclear as to whether or not the Berry decision could
still be applied to a situation such as this in light of the subsequent enactment of
87

See id. § 36-1A-3(2).

88

See id. § 36-IA-3(3).

89

See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.

90

See supra Section III.C.

91

See supraSection II.C.

92

262 S.E.2d 766 (W.Va.1980). See supraSection II.C.

93

Berry, 262 S.E.2d at 771.
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USRAP. This is due to the fact that USRAP states that "[t]he provisions of this
article supersede the rule of the common law known as the rule against
perpetuities."' Thus, the question remains whether equitable modification is a
subsidiary doctrine of the common law rule against perpetuities such that it was
superseded by USRAP? Again, the answer is unclear. In the commentary to
USRAP, which discusses subsidiary common-law doctrines that were superseded
by the act, the doctrine of equitable modification is not mentioned. 95 Furthermore,
one could argue that the doctrine of equitable modification recognizes the rule
against perpetuities and then modifies the will to conform to it, thus addressing the
will rather than operating as a subsidiary doctrine of the common-law rule against
perpetuities. Therefore, it may be possible to apply equitable modification to the
situation at hand. Additionally, in a case such as the hypothetical involving real
property (land) as opposed to a trust, the Court would likely favor reformation
under the Berry doctrine of equitable modification as it most closely conforms to
the public policy against restrictions on the alienability of land, it is not susceptible
to the harsh consequences of the common-law rule (because the interests are
judicially reformed), and it eliminates the uncertainty of the uniform statutory rule
by determining from the outset (the time the interest is created) in whom the
ultimate title to the land will vest.
Applying the doctrine of equitable modification to the above hypothetical
disposition, the testator's devises to his great grandchildren and great-great
grandchildren are initially invalid under the first step of perpetuity analysis (the
common-law rule against perpetuities).96 Furthermore, the testator's intent, as
clearly stated in his Will, is to keep the 300 acre tract of land in the family for as
long as legally possible (general intent), and to convey the land to his children,
grandchildren, great grandchildren, and great-great grandchildren as set forth in his
Will (particular intent). Thus, the testator's Will meets the requirements for
equitable modification as established in Berry.97 First, as pointed out above, the
testator's intent is clearly expressed in his Will. Additionally, his general intent of
keeping the land in the family for as long as legally possible does not violate the
rule against perpetuities. Subsequently, the testator's particular intent, specifically
the devises to his great grandchildren and great-great grandchildren, violates the
rule against perpetuities, but is not critical to the testamentary scheme. Finally,
modifying the Will (i.e., the remainder in the land to the grandchildren in fee
simple) will effectuate the testator's general intent, will avoid intestacy, and will
conform to the policy considerations underlying the rule, namely the policy against
restrictions on the alienability of land.

94

W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-8 (1997).

95

See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. H (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 352-56

(1993).
96

See supra Section IV.

97

See supranote 40 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of equitable modification should be applied to testamentary
dispositions which are initially invalid under the first step of USRAP perpetuity
analysis. Application of the doctrine of equitable modification would effectively
ameliorate the harsh consequences of the common-law rule against perpetuities,
while also eliminating the uncertainty of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities. Thus, equitable modification strikes the proper balance between the
advantages of the common-law rule against perpetuities and the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Michael S. Bailey
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